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Voting “à la carte”: Electoral Support for the radical right 
in the 200 Bulgarian Parliamentary Elections
Boyka Stefanova1
abstract: This paper explores the sources of votes for radical-right parties using the 
example of electoral support for the Attack Party in the 2005 Bulgarian parliamentary 
elections. It expands theoretical propositions on the presence of extremist parties in 
electoral politics by proposing an analytical model which explains radical-right voting 
as the result of disequilibria between political supply and voter demand in the electoral 
market. The paper argues that support for the radical right represents unmet voter 
demand and combines à la carte elements of single-issue politics, xenophobia, protest 
and charismatic political agency in electoral choice valid for individual voters but not 
for clearly identifiable cohorts of voters. The paper examines the evidence on electoral 
support for the Attack Party against the premises of the à la carte model – the structure of 
electoral competition, radical-right political agency, and voter preferences – and finds 
that the radical-right vote in the 2005 election validates its key proposition: electoral 
support for the radical right lacks coherent social structure and correspondence between 
voter expectations and party programmatic appeal. Based on the Bulgarian case study 
the paper concludes that the ability to offer voting choices à la carte, regardless of 
its ideological positions and the political expectations of its own electorate represents 
a resource for the sustained presence of the radical right in the electoral market.
Key words: Bulgaria, post-communist party systems, parliamentary elections, 
radical-right voting, Attack Party, à la carte model of electoral choice
introduction
This paper sheds light on the sources of electoral support for the radical right in 
Bulgaria using the example of the 2005 parliamentary elections. Apart from change 
in the governing coalition, the election marked the surprise electoral breakthrough of 
a newly formed political structure of the radical right, the Attack (Ataka) Party.2 
Attack first appeared in preliminary polls forecasting that it would collect around 
1 per cent of the vote, just four weeks before the election. By the time the campaign 
ended, pollsters projected that it would reach the 4 per cent threshold necessary to 
1 The author wishes to thank BBSS-Gallup International for providing survey data from the period Octo-
ber 2005-May 2006. Thanks are due to Andrey Raichev, Marchella Abrasheva and Marin Stoychev at 
BBSS–Gallup (Bulgaria). 
2 The party names Attack, Ataka (in Bulgarian), and Attack Party will be used in the text interchangeably. 
The electoral coalition National Union Attack, NUA, is comprised of the Attack Party, the National 
Movement for the Salvation of the Fatherland, the Bulgarian National-Patriotic Party, Union of Patriotic 
Forces and Military of the Reserve “Defence” and Zora political circle.
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obtain parliamentary seats. On election day, exit polls revealed that it ranked fourth 
among the 22 parties contesting the election, with 8.14 percent of the vote. Attack 
became the fourth largest parliamentary faction, outperforming all parties and coaliti-
ons of the mainstream right. 
The electoral success of the Attack Party is a puzzle in Bulgarian parliamentary 
politics. The party was established just two months prior to the 2005 election, on 
a nationalist, xenophobic and anti-minority platform. Yet electoral support for Attack 
cannot be regarded exclusively as a xenophobic reaction of the Bulgarian ethnic majo-
rity, which accounted for 99.2 per cent of its national vote share. Nationalist parties 
outside the political mainstream have been present in Bulgarian electoral competition 
since the 1990s but none had gained parliamentary representation or managed to 
obtain more than 1.0–1.5 percent of the vote.3 Furthermore, the ongoing right-wing 
diversification has continued to offer electoral choices to conservative voters. The 
openness of political competition and new party entry would be expected to prevent 
the consolidation of an anti-establishment vote, especially taking into account the 
strong ideological foundations of the Attack Party. The long-term trends in Bulga-
rian party politics point to the decline of ideological factors in political competition. 
Although such trends are compatible with surprise electoral outcomes, Attack’s entry 
into parliamentary politics was not the product of “flash” effects. Its broadly based 
voter support has been a shocking development, with the potential to undermine the 
prospects of democratic consolidation and sustainability of Bulgaria’s ethnic model, 
often described as “exemplary”. 
Uncovering the sources of Attack’s unanticipated electoral success is important 
also in view of the dramatic follow-up to its electoral fortunes in subsequent contests. 
As with the performance of the radical right in the 2002 presidential election in France, 
Attack’s leader, Volen Siderov, was ranked second after the incumbent in the 2006 
Bulgarian presidential election, receiving 21.5 percent of the vote in the first round and 
24.1 per cent in the second ballot.4
With the objective of solving the puzzle of Attack’s entry into parliamentary politics, 
this research builds on theoretical and empirical work on the sources and electoral beha-
viour of the radical right in Europe. Its principal approach is that of examining the pheno-
menon of Ataka from a long-term perspective, against broader trends of political change. 
One of the objectives is to expand theoretical propositions on the presence of extremist 
parties by emphasizing the role of structural disequilibria in the electoral market. 
3 Such parties have won seats as part of right-wing coalitions only in a few instances. The moderately 
nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-National Movement (VMRO) gained 
parliamentary representation as part of the UDF coalition in 1997. It won three mayoral races in the 
southwest of the country in the 1997 and 2001 municipal elections. In 2005 it was part of the Bulgarian 
People’s Union coalition. 
4 In the first round of the 2002 election in France the candidate of the National Front, Jean-Marie Le 
Pen, came second after the incumbent, with 16.9 per cent of the vote and contested the second ballot, 
receiving 17.8 per cent. 
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Conventional views regard the electoral outcome as a point of equilibrium between 
party supply and voter demand. However, the complex realities of voting are informed 
by broader currents, social change and situational factors which often fail to converge at 
the point of market clearance. The main argument of the study is that electoral support 
for the radical right is not a “meeting place” between supply and demand; it is rather 
a residual category in electoral competition – an “escape” or a protest vote – which 
captures unmet voter demand and persists as an attribute of the electoral market, rather 
than a niche within its ideological spectrum. Voting for the radical-right has evolved 
into a self-sustained model of voting à la carte, which combines different elements 
of single-issue politics, xenophobia and intolerance, protest and charismatic political 
agency, into electoral choice valid for individual voters but not for clearly identifiable 
cohorts of voters. Rather than focusing on the proximity between parties and voters, it 
posits their relative distancing. Voting à la carte further isolates the electorate from the 
social, economic, or value-based foundations of electoral preferences. 
Examination of the model with respect to votes for the radical right in the 2005 
parliamentary election will proceed as follows. The analysis first reviews theoretical 
perspectives on electoral support for the radical right and derives the key referents 
of the à la carte model of voting: the long-term structure of electoral competition; 
radical-right political agency, and the socio-political context of voter preferences. It 
then examines the factors shaping the electoral outcome of the Attack Party in the 
2005 election and points to the lack of correspondence between electoral mobilization 
and voter expectations, resulting in a customized à la carte model of electoral choice. 
Based on the evidence, the paper presents an argument about the factors likely to 
sustain the dynamics of electoral support for extreme right parties despite their proble-
matic conformity with democratic pluralism. 
Electoral support for the radical right in theory: market niches  
in electoral supply and demand
The radical right is comprised of diverse streams of political agency ranging from 
organizations to social movements and subcultures, analytically bound into the ideo-
logical family of radical-right political extremism.5 Studies on the electoral behaviour 
of radical-right parties, its by far most consequential political representative, concur 
that the wide variation which characterizes the field largely depends on the national 
context. Despite their diversity, the parties of the radical right share a core doctrine in 
nationalism (Mudde, 2000; Eatwell, 2003). They replace democratic pluralism with 
organic conceptions of political community, posit a direct relationship between leaders 
and electorate, and reject the political establishment as flawed and redundant.
The contemporary radical right does not necessarily follow the historical traditions 
of the old Fascist parties of the interwar period. It builds upon high-salience issues in 
5 As Merkl and Weinberg (1993) point out, the terms “radical” and extremist” may be used interchangeably.
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current political discourse: chauvinist conceptions of the modern welfare state, xeno-
phobic anti-immigrant appeals, anti-globalism, anti-regionalism and reaction against 
post-materialist values (Merkl and Weinberg, 2003). 
The theoretical perspectives on radical-right voting reflect the foundational principles 
of electoral competition and are oriented along demand – supply lines. Key supply-side 
propositions explain electoral support for the radical right as the product of electoral 
rules, the relative positioning of the mainstream parties, electoral opportunity structures 
and diverse streams of political agency-party development and charismatic leadership. 
Demand-based propositions suggest socio-structural change, individual values and ori-
entations, and economic protest as key explanatory variables of radical-right voting. 
Supply-side theories
There is a consensus in the literature that proportional representation is a factor 
enabling the electoral breakthrough of radical-right parties. Relatively low thresholds 
(between 3 and 5 per cent) make it possible for new and small fringe parties to win 
a degree of electoral support – especially, in secondary elections – sufficient to secure 
parliamentary seats. The system of electoral rules which shapes the distribution of 
political parties and voter preferences, as well as the relative fragmentation of political 
representation (Duverger, 1954), is a source of conditions facilitating or restricting 
the opportunities for radical-right voting. Furthermore, electoral rules determine the 
institutional framework of the vote such as availability of public campaign financing, 
ballot access, and opportunities for ticket splitting (Norris, 2005; Givens, 2005). The 
electoral system affects also the structural environment in which party élites operate 
and thus expands or restricts space for political entrepreneurship at the fringes. 
The prevalent neo-liberal, pro-globalization consensus imposes significant policy 
constraints on the parties in government. In two-party and multiparty systems alike, 
political actors converge towards median positions representing an ideological con-
sensus on market liberalism, economic reform, and inclusive welfare. Such uniformity 
opens up political space at the fringes to channels of voter mobilization based on anti-
establishment rhetoric. 
Such premises are reflected in the “winning formula” thesis which posits radical-
right voting as the product of political agency under conditions of programmatic 
convergence between the parties of the right and left (Kitschelt, 1995). Due to conver-
gence, the right loses its appeal to conservative voters. The latter are likely to turn to the 
radical right if it offers a “winning formula”, combining market liberalism, xenophobic 
welfare, and conservative-authoritarian appeals. An alternative supply-side proposition 
holds that the presence of mainstream right-wing parties in governing coalitions is the 
key variable determining electoral support for the radical right. Conservative voters 
may turn to the right-wing fringes as an expression of dissatisfaction with government 
policies (Zimmermann and Saalfiled, 1993).
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Such models share the assumption that political agency operates within a more or 
less stable political infrastructure, which enables political entrepreneurs to generate 
new or respond to existing voter demand. 
The concept of a political opportunity structure, originally developed with regard 
to social movements theory, is consistent with supply-side theories of voting (Tilly, 
1978; Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1988). The political opportunity structure is the 
infrastructure of collective action and combines political supply- and demand-side 
variables (Tarrow, 1988: 429; Kitschelt, 1986: 59). The link between political oppor-
tunities for (collective) action and social protest constitutes another analytical premise 
which connects political opportunity structures to radical-right voting. A multivariate 
electoral opportunity structure perspective runs the risk of becoming either underspe-
cified or overdeterministic and therefore of limited utility to establish the causal links 
to radical-right voting. The strategic agency model proposed by Pippa Norris (2005) 
overcomes this potential deficiency by keeping institutional rules analytically distinct 
from political agency and individual demands. The model grants institutional factors 
primary explanatory power, without ignoring the influence that external shocks, shifts 
in public opinion and other demand-side factors have on voter choices. 
Supply-side perspectives are conscious of the causal effects of radical-right political 
agency. Charismatic leadership and political entrepreneurship within the radical right are 
key explanatory variables of electoral support for such parties (Schain et al., 2002).
Electoral demand
Demand-side theories of the radical right refer to three clusters of variables to 
explain radical right voting: interests, values, and psychological orientations. Soci-
ological accounts emphasize the role of social change and transformation in advan-
ced industrial countries, which “unfreezes” the existing cleavage structure (Lipset 
and Rokkan, 1967). Traditional cleavages decline in importance, leading to voter 
dealignment (Dalton, 2002). In line with this proposition, radical-right voting may 
be explained as an unstructured vote, unrelated to particular socio-demographic and 
socio-economic variables. Alternative sociological accounts associate changes in the 
cleavage structure with the emergence of new societal categories and “new politics” 
dominated by individual high-salience issues and discourses. The traditional class 
structure of owners and workers is replaced by new divisions emerging between the 
global and the national, the national and local, as well as between national majorities 
and the non-citizen population, and/or among ethnic majority and minority groups. 
Empirical studies show that the cohorts of the lower working class and the unemployed 
are typically over-represented in the radical-right vote (Norris, 2005). 
Elaborations on the transformed cleavage structure thesis state that the radical 
right constitutes either a reaction to the emergence of new social divisions in the post-
industrial world, or the individual’s reaction to post-modernism (Kriesi, 1999; Ignazi, 
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2003). A related sociological thesis posits electoral support for the radical right as 
a “normal pathological” deviation; individual protest against mass society and moder-
nization and a preference for traditional values and authority, leadership, and belonging 
(Wilcox et al., 2003; Zimmermann, 2003). 
Value-based theories posit radical-right voting as the product of individual-level 
variables such as personal orientations and situational predispositions. A focus on 
values permits establishment of a link between party strategies and voter preferences 
evident, for example, in the “winning formula” thesis. Most studies conclude that con-
ceptions of an organic political community, xenophobic and exclusionary notions of 
nationalism, and racism differentiate the extreme right from the mainstream right-wing 
parties and reveal the value-based foundations of radical right voting (Hainsworth, 
2000; Merkl and Weinberg 2003). 
A third branch of demand-based theories of radical right voting emphasizes the role 
of economic interests (Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1988). Government economic per-
formance generates diverse voter reactions based on evaluations of personal situation 
and sociotropic assessments leading to continued support for the incumbent party or 
a vote for the opposition, often regardless of the ideological proximity between parties 
and voters. This argument is instrumental to the thesis of economic protest voting 
which treats protest as a purposive orientation, rather than a situational vote. 
The protest vote hypothesis is an alternative explanation of radical-right voting, 
which posits electoral support for the radical right as a reaction typical of traditional 
non-voters (Ignazi, 2003). According to this “none of the above” proposition (Norris, 
2005: 149), voters do not expect the party of their choice to win in the election. The 
radical right benefits from the protest vote as a vote against the political establishment. 
Transcending demand- and supply-based explanations, Eatwell (2003) has advan-
ced the micro-meso-macro hypothesis of radical-right voting, which emphasizes 
factor interactions across levels of analysis. Eatwell’s approach integrates political 
opportunity structure variables and voter perceptions of legitimacy, personal efficacy, 
and political trust as a causal stream which explains variation in electoral support for 
the radical right across national contexts. Eatwell’s model offers significant analytical 
advantages by capturing the multivariate determinants of the radical-right vote. One 
of the drawbacks of the model is the lack of a core structural referent. As empiri-
cal research has pointed out, electoral support for the radical right often cannot be 
explained as a consistent arrangement of individual factors and their additive effects 
(Mudde, 2000: 19). Such findings suggest that it is likely to be associated with a failure 
of the electoral market to reach equilibrium between the ideological positions, values, 
structural determinants, expectations, appeals and evaluations of parties and voters.
The à la carte proposition on radical-right voting advanced here is based on the 
assumption of persistent disequilibria between party supply and electoral demand, 
resulting in voter support for radical-right parties. Its core premise is that of unmet voter 
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demand. The model consists of three layers of factors whose impact on the electoral 
fortunes of the radical right varies depending on its capacity to influence the situational 
context of electoral campaigns. The outer layer is comprised of systemic factors, such as 
electoral rules and long-term attributes of the party system, which have indirect effects 
on the opportunities for radical-right voting. The intermediate layer is derived from the 
patterns of inter-party competition and includes both exogenous and endogenous varia-
bles of political agency: campaign strategies of the mainstream parties and ideological 
positioning and voter mobilization on behalf of the radical right. The centre represents 
residual voter demand produced by social change and individual voter expectations and 
unmatched by corresponding party supply. According to this model, the radical right 
appeals to diverse categories of voters. For some voters support for the radical right is 
protest, resentment, or xenophobia, for others – charismatic appeal, nationalism, insecu-
rity, or negative performance evaluations. The vote is not necessarily consistent across 
time and individual categories of voters. Why is this mix-and-match pattern possible 
and, more importantly, sustainable? It is because elections are discrete events seeking 
equilibrium between party supply and voter demand in an otherwise dynamic context 
of social and political change. The possibility for diverse combinations between voter 
preferences, structure of party competition, and organizational capabilities accounts 
for considerable variation in electoral outcomes. Often, weak party structures receive 
considerable electoral support thanks to a charismatic leader, or simply due to a protest 
vote. The deeper reason for radical-right voting is the lack of conceptual innovation and 
the distancing between party élites and electorate within the political mainstream. While 
fundamentally demand-centred, the à la carte model accommodates supply-induced 
electoral outcomes depending on the proximity and intensity of political agency. 
The validity of the model is examined with regard to Attack’s electoral outcome in 
the 2005 election. Such an analytical perspective allows us to address the question of 
whether Ataka created a niche for itself in the electoral market or whether it tapped into 
existing (and unmet) electoral demand, determined by social structure and value chan-
ge. The evidence is explored through multi-level data analysis. Supply-side variables, 
such as electoral opportunity structure, party system and political agency, are based 
on summary national statistics and district-level data on party vote shares reported 
by the Central Electoral Commission (Bulgaria). Demand-side variables are derived 
from public opinion polls conducted by BBSS-Gallup International during the period 
October 2005-May 2006, exit poll summaries reported in the Bulgarian media, and 
World Values Surveys (Bulgaria 1990, 1997, 1999) and Eurobarometer data. 
Political opportunity structure of the 200 parliamentary election
The structure of Bulgarian political competition during the 1990s shared the 
common features of post-communist party systems on the road to democracy: parties 
without a developed civil society, low voter trust, and competition without institutiona-
lization (Rose and Munro, 2003). Political parties have been the principal beneficiary 
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of the unsettled character of electoral politics. Proportional representation, high levels 
of competition, new party entry, and variation in voter turnout rates have established 
a typical “party-enabling” system which tends to privilege party initiative and control 
over the electoral process (Birch, 2003: 22).
In line with the à la carte proposition, we would expect the system of electoral 
rules to be relevant to Attack’s electoral breakthrough in several aspects: the principle 
of proportional representation, which determines the size of the system and the oppor-
tunity of new and minor parties to receive electoral support; the threshold for seat 
eligibility, which affects the proportionality between the vote and seat allocation; and 
conditions of ballot access. 
The rules of electoral competition in Bulgaria include proportional representation 
with a 4 per cent threshold for parliamentary entry. The party vote is pooled at the 
national level, according to the d’Hondt method.6 Voting takes place in multi-member 
electoral districts with closed party lists ranging between 4 and 14 seats per district. 
District size is determined according to census data. 
The proportionality system has been a positive factor in new party development by 
balancing consolidation and openness criteria. After the 1997 election openness prevailed 
over consolidation, thus reinforcing the long-term opportunity structure for new parties. 
A typical feature of the Bulgarian electoral politics is that since the 1990 constitutive ele-
ction, every governing party or coalition has been voted out of power at the next election. 
Three political parties have preserved their place in parliamentary politics: the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party (BSP) on the left, the right-wing Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), and 
the centrist, predominantly ethnic-Turk Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF).In 
every election except 1997 new parties have gained parliamentary representation. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Bulgarian Electoral System (1990-2005)
year 0  4 7 200 200
Voter Turnout (%) 90.6 83 .87 78.05 62 .93 67.03 55 .76
Share of two largest 
parties (%)
83 .4 67.50 67 .73 74 .33 60.92 50.82
Number of parties 
contesting an election
42 38 49 39 54 22
Volatility (%)1  – 21 .6 26 .3 25.50 32 .53 35 .53
Wasted Vote (%)  0.9 25.0 15.60  7 .64 14 .48  8 .19
New party vote 
(% vote / % seats)
 – 11.5/0.0 13.7/4.5 4.9/0.0 42.73/50.0 19.77/21.7
Sources: Birch (2003: 112), Siaroff (200: 36, 37) and author’s calculations. For voter turnout rates see the 
Bulgarian Mathematics Society (Izbori) (Elections) website, http://www.math.bas.bg/izbori/ and Central 
Electoral Commission, Bulgaria, http://www.electionsorg.bg (18 September 2006).
6 For the method of conversion, see Gary Cox (1997: 59).
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The data reveals that the pattern of Bulgarian electoral politics changed abruptly 
as a result of the 2001 election, with supply-side volatility, share of the new party 
vote, and the number of parties contesting the election increasing sharply, without 
a meaningful restructuring of electoral rules. The changes in the party system are as-
sociated with changes in the structure of interparty competition. A new liberal-populist 
party, the National Movement Simeon the Second (NMSS), received 42.73 per cent 
of the vote and 50.0 per cent of the seats in the 2001 election. The entry of NMSS 
into electoral politics replaced the bipolar left-right model of political competition by 
introducing a tendency towards populism and candidate-centred politics. The 2005 
election confirmed this trend by increasing the number of parliamentary parties with 
the following distribution of vote and seat shares:7
Table 2: Distribution of electoral outcomes in the 2005 election
Party/Coalition Vote (%) Seats (%)
Coalition for Bulgaria, BSP; CfB 30.95 33 .98
National Movement Simeon the Second, NMSS 19 .88 21 .83
United Democratic Forces, UtDF  7 .68  8 .44
Movement for Rights and Freedoms, MRF 12 .81 14.07
National Union Attack, NUA  8 .14  8 .93
Democrats for Strong Bulgaria, DSB  6 .44  7.07
Bulgarian People’s Union, BPU  5 .19  5.70
Source: Central Electoral Commission (Bulgaria), official communication of electoral results, 
http://www.electionsorg.bg (20 September 2006).
Proportionality has ensured that electoral competition remains fragmented. While 
allowing new party entry, it also forces new parties to compete both among themselves 
and against the established parties in order to pass the 4 per cent threshold. In this 
situation, the system of electoral rules restricts the opportunities for radical-right 
voting. Two new right-wing parties, the DSB and BPU, both located further to the right 
than the main right-wing coalition, the UtDF, gained parliamentary representation as 
a result of the 2005 election besides Ataka, effectively constraining its opportunity to 
appeal to conservative voters. 
Other indicators, such as system fragmentation, proportionality, and volatility, are 
also relevant in shaping the electoral opportunity structure. The moderate threshold 
7 The list of party organizations relevant to the 2005 parliamentary election includes: National Union 
Attack, NUA, led by the Attack Party; Bulgarian People’s Union, BPU (a coalition of the Union of Free 
Democrats); Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization, (VMRO); Bulgarian Agrarian National 
Union-People’s Union, BANU-PU; Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP and its electoral Coalition for Bulgaria, 
CfB; Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria, DSB; Movement for Rights and Freedoms, MRF; National Move-
ment Simeon the Second, NMSS; New Time; Union of Democratic Forces, UDF and its electoral coalition 
United Democratic Forces, UtDF. For the context and details of the 2005 election, see Spirova (2006). 
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for parliamentary representation raises the index of proportionality and reduces the 
dispersion between party vote and seat share. Throughout the 1990s, the level of pro-
portionality of the Bulgarian party system has been higher than the average for Central 
and Eastern Europe (87 versus 84 per cent) leading to a lower percentage of the wasted 
vote (Rose and Munro, 2003: 28). The mirror indicator, the discrepancy between 
votes and seats, reveals a declining share of the two largest parties in all elections 
after 1990, reinforcing the character of the system as one of openness and moderate 
pluralism (Siaroff 2000: 72). Reduced system concentration has been beneficial to 
new, smaller parties. Three such parties and coalitions passed the 4 percent threshold 
in 2005. 
The most prominent systematic feature of Bulgarian electoral politics has been the 
increasing volatility of the vote under conditions of system pluralization. Rose and 
Munro have defined this unstable, almost accidental equilibrium of electoral outcomes 
as “a floating system of parties” (2003: 77). Electoral volatility rose in 2001 and 
remained high in the 2005 election. It was produced both by structural (supply-side) 
volatility, entrance and/or exit of parties from electoral competition, and demand-side 
shifts in voter preferences among existing parties. 
Besides the general influence over the conditions of electoral competition, the 
electoral institutions apply specific provisions effectively restricting the creation and 
ballot access of extreme-right parties. As Sarah Birch has noted, the Bulgarian elec-
toral system is “entrenched” in the Constitution, which prescribes domestic and party 
politics according to pluralist rules (Article 1). The Constitution is highly restrictive 
vis-à-vis separatist and anti-system parties and prohibits parties on ethnic, racial or 
religious grounds (Article 11). The Constitutional Court interprets the ethnic principle 
more broadly by defining as “ethnic” parties restricting membership of other ethnic 
groups.8 Article 44 (2) prohibits political parties which incite racial, national, ethnic, or 
religious enmity or restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens.9 
The Act on Political Parties also prohibits parties which undermine the sovereignty 
and integrity of the country.10 The Penal Code (Article 162) makes actions inciting 
ethnic and racial hatred punishable by law. More recent legislation, including the 
Anti-Discrimination Act passed in1998 and the Framework Programme for Roma 
Integration (1999), envisages measures against hate speech, social exclusion and anti-
minority politics.
Despite the generally open opportunity structure, it may be argued that electoral 
institutions have had an overall restrictive effect on the rise of the radical right. Con-
stitutional constraints on ethnically motivated parties, increasingly restrictive rules of 
8 Based on this interpretation, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, whose membership is open to all 
citizens but which derives more than 85% of its vote share from the ethnic minorities in Bulgaria, is not 
considered an ethnic party. See Ishiyama and Breuning (1998). 
9 See State Gazette No. 56 (13 July 1991).
10 See Act on Political Parties, as amended, State Gazette 28/2005 (1 April 2005).
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party registration,11 and system openness, which dilutes competition among the small 
parties, historically have prevented radical-right parties from engaging in nationalist or 
xenophobic political mobilization. At the same time, the lack of system consolidation 
remains the principal factor sustaining a long-term open electoral opportunity structure. 
In line with the à la carte model electoral rules have had overall indirect conditioning 
effects over party supply on the extreme-right fringe. The next section will examine 
the structure of party competition, where the radical right positions itself as a political 
actor and electoral entrepreneur. 
The structure of party competition as a source of radical-right voting
The Bulgarian mainstream parties have shared a commitment to pro-market and 
pro-individual freedom principles and sought reconciliation between market liberalism 
and social welfare. The idea of “social capitalism” is a common policy position for all 
political parties. By contrast, upon its arrival in the electoral competition the Attack 
Party rejected the existing political consensus by advancing an exclusionary nationa-
list, anti-market and anti-liberal campaign. Attack’s presence in Bulgarian politics is 
therefore at odds with the long-term perspective of party development.
It may be argued that despite its surprise appearance in the 2005 election, the 
ideological foundations of Ataka were laid down long before its organizational contact 
with the realities of voting and originally made no purposive reference to electoral 
mobilization. This discrepancy between the conceptual evolution and organizational 
development of the party is due to the unsettled role of nationalism in Bulgarian politics. 
The nationalist idea, as well as marginal political structures – nationalist and ethnic 
minority parties – have had a standing presence in electoral competition. However, 
prior to the 2005 election, nationalism was not an important factor in the distribution 
of electoral outcomes.
Political agency in a long-term perspective: intellectual sources  
of the Bulgarian extreme right
Extreme right organizations do not typically attract societal interest in Bulgaria, 
although isolated expressions of right-wing extremism, negative stereotyping of 
ethnic minorities, especially of Roma people, or extremist tendencies within the 
political mainstream cannot be excluded (Ivanov and Ilieva, 2005: 2). A number of 
party structures based on a nationalist ideology were recreated or established after the 
fall of communism, ranging from parties espousing extreme radical-left nationalism 
associated with the communist past to far-right parties recreating populist movements 
of the interwar period to contemporary “homegrown” currents emerging as a result of 
the radicalization of the mainstream right. 
11 An amendment in 2005 to the Elections Act doubled the registration deposit requirement for parties and 
coalitions. 
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Left-wing radicalism includes the Committee for the Defence of the National Inte-
rests (CDNI), the intellectual radical-left nationalist circle and later the Dawn (Zora) 
party, and the political movement Defence, a radical-left formation, registered as 
a party in 1998 under the name Union of Patriotic Forces and Military of the Reserve 
“Defence”.12 Both Zora and Defence became founding members of Attack’s electoral 
coalition, National Union Attack (NUA). The right-wing component of the Bulgarian 
radical right includes the “dark-blue McCarthyism” of the democratic mainstream right 
and a reactionary faction of the principal anti-communist democratic coalition, the 
UDF (Bell, 1999: 235). By 1991, the “dark-blue” splinter movement within the UDF 
developed a core doctrine of xenophobia, exclusionary nationalism, and opposition to 
party pluralism. Circles within the democratic right openly questioned the presence 
of the predominantly ethnic-Turkish party, the MRF, in Bulgarian politics, and later 
caused a series of divisions within the entire democratic movement.13 Parallel to such 
tendencies within the political mainstream, a number of extra-parliamentary party 
structures (re)emerged on the far right. Although more numerous than the radical-left 
nationalist-populist currents, they have remained marginal and include predominantly 
parties with a nationalist and xenophobic ideology.14 Two such parties, the Bulgarian 
National Union and the Bulgarian National-Patriotic Party, joined Attack’s electoral 
coalition in 2005. 
Charismatic leadership and organizational development  
of the attack Party
The political platform of the radical-right opposition and the creation of the Attack 
Party may be attributed to the political activities of its most prominent leader to date, 
Volen Siderov. Siderov’s political career developed within the anti-communist UDF 
circles in the early 1990s. He rose to the position of Editor-in-Chief of UDF party 
organ Democratsia Daily (1990-1992). During the second half of the 1990s, Siderov’s 
political views gradually refocused beyond the post-communist left – democratic right 
divide towards a new interpretation of political conflict anchored in a xenophobic 
populist-nationalist ideology. 
Although in his early political commentary Siderov did not use the nationalist idea 
as a vehicle of mass mobilization, his career as a journalist was instrumental in susta-
ining those political forces which shared the conception of a monocultural Bulgarian 
state. His published work consists of racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic writings 
based on variations of international conspiracy theories. A collection of his articles 
12 Attack Vice-chairman Peter Beron was originally a member of Defence (and prior to that, a founding 
member and Chairman of the UDF).
13 By the late 1990s the UDF had split into the UDF-Liberals, which failed to pass the 4 percent threshold 
in 2001, and the Union of Free Democrats (SSD), which contested the 2005 election as part of the 
Bulgarian People’s Union. 
14 A detailed account of radical-right party structures and movements preceding the creation of the Attack 
Party is provided in Ivanov and Ilieva (2005). 
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originally published in the nationalist Monitor daily and other media outlets between 
1997 and 2002 appeared under the title Bulgarophobia (2003). This book contains 
the four major themes of Siderov’s “national” political idea: one-nation state, anti-
establishment populism, rejection of democratic pluralism, and single-issue discourses 
anchored in identity politics. Since 2003 regular broadcasts of Siderov’s Attack show 
on cable channel SKAT TV have broadened public access to such extremist political 
views. While at the early stages his nationalist-populist rhetoric attracted viewer inte-
rest mostly due to its criticism of the Establishment, in the context of the 2005 election 
nationalism became Siderov’s principal resource of electoral mobilization. 
The creation of the Attack Party and its electoral coalition National Union Attack 
emerged as the next stage of crystallization of the political platform of the radical right. 
Ataka anchored its electoral campaign on exclusionary ethnic nationalism. From an 
organizational point of view, it neither subsumed, nor made an effort to consolidate the 
existing nationalist currents. On the contrary, Attack further marginalized them. Party 
leader Siderov claimed that Attack was the true opposition to the party establishment 
and the only organizational structure with a real contribution to the political mobili-
zation of the electorate.15 In typical populist style, he pointed to the “awakening” and 
“soaring spirit” of the Bulgarian people and his personal input as sources of Attack’s 
electoral breakthrough. “I did not advance these ideas in the last few weeks [prior 
to the 2005 election]. They have been the essence of my personality for years. And 
when one possesses the faith and confidence to pursue them, it turns out one can be 
successful.”16 Such statements do not fit well with the “winning formula” thesis which 
explains the electoral success of the radical right through its capacity to attract conser-
vative voters under conditions of programmatic convergence between the mainstream 
parties. Ataka’s ideological platform claimed its own political space regardless of the 
relative positioning within the political mainstream. It refused to identify its ideological 
standing as either a left- or a right-wing organization but underlined its populist-nati-
onalist principles. Attack’s electoral behaviour also contradicts the winning formula 
thesis. It made no effort to capture the vote of particular categories of voters; it rather 
replicated the new-entry model of the centrist-populist NMSS from the 2001 election. 
The original NMSS electoral breakthrough model was based on several tenets: a loose 
electoral party, created just several months before the election, in coalition with minor 
“satellite” parties and dominated by a charismatic leader. While seeking to benefit from 
the success of the surprise strategy which brought the NMSS to power in 2001 through 
a vague combination of market populism and charismatic leadership, Siderov also 
significantly reshaped the model by enhancing its ideological content. It is questiona-
ble, however, to what extent that content met with genuine public receptiveness to the 
nationalist idea. Attack’s programmatic documentation, while intensely ideological, 
remained underspecified, incoherent, and unrealistic. 
15 See Interview of Volen Siderov in Nova Zora Weekly, 20 July 2005, pp. 2–4.
16 Ibid., p 2, author’s translation. 
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The party electoral manifesto consists of a list of twenty principles (the “Twenty 
Points,” personally written by Siderov but introduced as a collective party document) 
and a more detailed paper entitled Programme Scheme of the Attack Party, which lays 
down its programmatic positions.17 While the Twenty Points represents an eclectic 
compilation of electoral proposals under the motto “Let us give Bulgaria back to 
the Bulgarians,” the Programme Scheme is an effort to articulate a programme for 
government. 
Attack’s founding ideology posits a one-nation state with no acknowledgement 
of the existence of ethnic minorities and multiculturalism. It seeks to enhance the 
spirituality of the nation by elevating the status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church 
to that of a political actor. Key national priorities are determined by the premise that 
Bulgaria needs to regain full independence from foreign (Western) interests, which had 
turned the country into a “protectorate”. Attack demands the immediate withdrawal of 
Bulgarian troops from Iraq, a referendum on NATO membership and the presence of 
US military bases in Bulgaria while proposing “adequate” defence capabilities in line 
with the “regional balance of power” and a national-interest approach to European 
integration. Economic independence is to be achieved through an “appropriate” mix of 
public and private property, Bulgarian ownership of industry, commerce and banking, 
and a strong interventionist state which, through active redistribution policies, defends 
the interests of national firms and ensures the welfare of its citizens. Attack is against 
free trade and globalization, which it associates with neo-colonialism and poverty. 
Typical of the issue positions of the extreme right, Attack’s domestic policy agenda 
is designed to eliminate ethnic multiculturalism. It combines xenophobic approaches 
to social welfare and political rights with law and order measures. In a rhetoric rese-
mbling the anti-immigrant and anti-minority appeals of the radical right in Western 
Europe (Hainsworth, 2000), Attack proposes anti-crime measures directly targeting the 
Roma and Turkish minority in Bulgaria18 and claims that the MRF should be banned 
from politics as unconstitutional. Although it does not explicitly state opposition to 
democratic pluralism and liberalism, Attack’s programmatic documentation fails to 
make reference to democratic principles of politics. Its manifesto suggests that the par-
ty seeks to offer voters political alternatives beyond single-issue politics by replacing 
the essence of the post-communist consensus on market liberalism and Euro-Atlantic 
integration. 
17 Ataka’s leadership has sought to differentiate itself from the party’s electoral platform as articulated 
in the Twenty Principles, stating that the party manifesto originally focused on socio-economic issues 
and did not contain racist or xenophobic statements. See Interview with Yordan Velichkov (Ataka MP), 
Standart News (Internet edition), 29 August 2005, at http://standartnews.com/archive/2005/08/29/eng-
lish/opinion/s4541_2.htm (14 September 2005). The Twenty-Principles list is available at http://www.
ataka.bg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=29. The Programme Scheme 
is available at http://www.ataka.bg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=29 
(20 November 2006). 
18 See statement of Ataka representative Lubomir Ivanov to the effect that members of the Roma commu-
nity with criminal record should be sent to labour camps, quoted in 24 Hours Daily, 25 June 2005, p. 5. 
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 Attack’s electoral programme positions it as a strongly ideological and reactionary 
political actor and, at the same time, as a demagogic and amorphous party with an 
incomplete and contingent organizational development. Although the party appears 
to launch a populist reform programme, the latter is more effective as a criticism of 
the political establishment, rather than a constructive programme of change. The poor 
fit between values and policy positions makes it an unlikely source of mass electoral 
appeal. Attack’s core ideological tenet is nationalism; however, apart from monocul-
turalism, which under certain circumstances may have attracted voters from the ethnic 
majority, its electoral programme contains diverse propositions which are at odds 
with the general consensus, especially with regard to European integration. Although 
Siderov had argued that Attack’s foundations in nationalism were long-established, 
he himself did not relate it to existing social sentiments. Siderov first mentioned nati-
onalism as a political platform, the “messenger” announcing the “political death” of 
the party establishment, for the first time in 2002.19 He later personally acknowledged 
that a nationalist party was not feasible at that time (evidently, because nationalist 
predispositions within the electorate were lacking). 
It follows that if political agency factors had a causal effect on electoral support 
for the radical right in the 2005 election, they should be sought within the specifics 
of Attack’s electoral campaign, rather than its programmatic appeal. If equilibrium 
models of political agency or voter proximity (Downs, 1957) were in place, the obvious 
disconnect between ideology, issue positions, and the context of voter demand would 
have isolated voters. But under the à la carte model voters did not form coherent 
expectations with regard to Attack’s ideological tenets, policy positions and electoral 
appeals. The anti-establishment rhetoric was instrumental in marketing the party as an 
acceptable electoral choice whereby voters could vote in a “mix-and-match” fashion 
without evaluating its ideological coherence, programmatic appeal, or capabilities 
for policy implementation. Most importantly, Attack presented the electorate with 
the opportunity of à la carte protest voting by combining anti-establishment rhetoric, 
reversal of the policy consensus, and anti-system bias.
Campaign strategies and electoral geography of the attack vote 
Ataka was in a position to present its electoral programme as an alternative to the 
mainstream parties due to the existing similarities and convergence of their program-
matic positions. Throughout the 1990s, the imperatives of economic transition – mac-
ro-economic stabilization, privatization, structural reform, and European integration 
– often determined by the international institutions which guided the transition, left 
little room for policy alternatives to the parties in government. The “Europeanization” 
of Bulgarian domestic politics was shaped by the criteria for EU membership, defined 
as the rule of law, respect for human rights and protection of minorities, and a market 
19 See Nationalism Is Our Immune System, (Siderov 2003: 362-64), quote on p. 364. 
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economy. All governments of the left (1994–1997), the centre-right (1991–1992 and 
1997-2001), and the centre (2001–2005) implemented policies promoting economic 
liberalism and democratic pluralism. Policy convergence among the political parties 
was thus structurally determined. They offered voters no real issue alternatives.
Voter approval for the radical right rose as it intensified its anti-political-establis-
hment rhetoric. Siderov’s Ataka show on cable television and other media outlets, 
especially the nationalist press, Nova Zora and Between the Lines, permitted it to gain 
national coverage. On the eve of the election Ataka had established regional party 
offices in 20 of the 31 electoral districts. Pre-election polls revealed that its popularity 
was rapidly increasing. The line graph of voter preferences after the 2001 election 
and voting intentions during the 2005 campaign shows the relative positioning of the 
radical right against the mainstream parties. The graph reveals considerable variation 
in voting intentions indicative of the lack of consistency in voter preferences. 
Graph 1: Voting intentions, 2001–2005
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Source: compiled from media reports. See News.bg online edition 4 June 2005,
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By the end of May 2005 Attack’s estimated support was around the 1 per 
cent threshold. It was gaining on average 2 per cent per week, parallel to 
sustained support for the left-wing (BSP), stabilization of support for the 
centre (NMSS), and increasing support for the mainstream right (UtDF, 
DSB and BPU) and the minority vote (MRF). Two weeks prior to the 
election, the share of non-voters consolidated at around 40-45 per cent (a 
number validated by the actual voter turnout) suggesting that electoral 
support for Ataka cannot be directly attributed to the protest vote, 
otherwise typical of the non-voter.70 While three weeks prior to the 
election the Attack vote was projected at 1.6 per cent, its actual vote 
reached 8.14 per cent. No structural factors could have anticipated such 
an outcome, as voting intentions for the mainstream parties were either 
stable or on the increase as well.      
Correlation analysis conducted with district-level data on political supply 
reveals that the modalities of interparty competition and electoral 
behaviour of the mainstream parties were relevant to the electoral support 
for Ataka. The following variables measure the distribution of electoral 
outcomes: 2005 vote shares by district, percentage decline or increase in 
district vote shares 2001-2005 (relevant to BSP, MRF, NMSS, and 
UtDF), and share of ethnic minorities by district. Testing for association 
between Attack’s vote share and the electoral fortunes of the mainstream 
70 Attack’s projected vote share of 1.6% emerged in an Alfa Research poll on 3 June 
2005. Source:  http://www.aresearch.org/doc.php?en=0&id=17 (20 September 2006). 
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By the end of May 2005 Attack’s estimated support was around the 1 per cent threshold. 
It was gaining on average 2 per cent per week, parallel to sustained support for the left-
wing (BSP), stabilization of support for the centre (NMSS), and increasing support for the 
mainstream right (UtDF, DSB and BPU) and the minority vote (MRF). Two weeks prior 
to the election, the share of non-voters consolidated at around 40–45 per cent (a number 
validated by the actual voter turnout) suggesting that electoral support for Ataka cannot 
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be directly attributed to the protest vote, otherwise typical of the non-voter.20 While three 
weeks prior to the election the Attack vote was projected at 1.6 per cent, its actual vote 
reached 8.14 per cent. No structural factors could have anticipated such an outcome, as 
voting intentions for the mainstream parties were either stable or on the increase as well. 
Correlation analysis conducted with district-level data on political supply reveals 
that the modalities of interparty competition and electoral behaviour of the mainstream 
parties were relevant to the electoral support for Ataka. The following variables measure 
the distribution of electoral outcomes: 2005 vote shares by district, percentage decline 
or increase in district vote shares 2001-2005 (relevant to BSP, MRF, NMSS, and UtDF), 
and share of ethnic minorities by district. Testing for association between Attack’s vote 
share and the electoral fortunes of the mainstream parties allows us to establish whether 
Attack’s vote share was derived from the relationship to the mainstream party vote, 
especially with respect to the electoral decline of the NMSS and UDF. Another set of 
bivariate correlations tests the thesis that electoral support for the Attack Party was the 
result of nationalist xenophobic sentiments directed against ethnic minorities. 
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20 Attack’s projected vote share of 1.6% emerged in an Alfa Research poll on 3 June 2005. Source: http://
www.aresearch.org/doc.php?en=0&id=17 (20 September 2006).
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The matrix of bivariate correlations indicates that the association between radical-
right voting and voting for both the left-wing and right-of-centre parties at the district 
level is weak and not statistically significant. According to the winning formula thesis, 
we would expect Attack to have attracted right-wing voters, reflected in a meaningful 
negative correlation with the vote shares of the right-wing parties. 
The matrix shows that the correlation between the Attack vote and the mainstream-
party vote is statistically significant only with respect to the liberal centre – with the 
decline of the NMSS vote since 2001 (correlation coefficient r = –0.539**) and with 
the MRF vote in the 2005 election (correlation coefficient r = –0.416*). The negative 
sign of both correlations suggests that if Attack was able to capitalize on declining 
electoral support for the principal incumbent party NMSS, which lost on average 
23.83 per cent of its national vote share in 2001, the electoral success of the ethnically 
based MRF had a potentially negative impact on radical-right voting.21 Such findings 
suggest that factors pertaining to the structure of party competition are relevant to 
Attack’s electoral outcome, although not in the direction prescribed by conventional 
explanations. The relationship between the NMSS and MRF vote shares, on the one 
hand, and electoral support for Ataka, on the other hand, suggests that radical-right 
voting in opposition to the parties in government is a plausible explanation. However, 
the correlation matrix also shows that no statistically significant relationship can be 
established between the presence of ethnic minorities and radical-right voting. As 
Attack’s candidates ran predominantly on an anti-minority platform, it would be 
logical to expect that in the ethnically mixed regions they would receive the support 
of voters with nationalist-authoritarian predispositions. By contrast, there is a strong 
negative correlation between the vote shares of the mainstream parties (except MRF) 
and the concentration of ethnic minorities: for example, with respect to support for the 
two new right-wing parties, the DSB and BPU (correlation coefficients r = –.56** and 
r = –.74**, respectively). 
Furthermore, summary statistics show that in the ethnically mixed districts the 
Attack vote was around or below its national average; an indicator that there was 
a lack of correspondence between its anti-minority campaign and voter preferences. 
The following comparisons between the distribution of the ethnic minority and radical-
right votes confirm the results established through correlation tests.
21 The values of NMSS
Δ01-05
 are negative.
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Table 4: Geography of minorities and radical-right voting by district, 2005 (N = 31)
Highest MrF
Vote Share
Ethnic Turk/
(Minority)
 in District
attack Vote
Share in 
District
Highest attack 
Vote Share
Minority/
(Ethnic Turk) 
Population  
in District
roma 
Population
in District
District % % Rank % Rank District % % Rank % Rank
Kurdzhali 67.30 61 .65(65.89)
1
(1) 2.40 31 Ruse 12.30
19 .82
(13.92)
9
(5) 3 .65 20
Razgrad 46.00 47 .21(56.00)
2
(2) 6.50 23
Veliko 
Turnovo 11.40
11 .62
(7.70)
19
(14) 2.07 24
Turgo-
vishte 37.80
35 .95
(44.59)
3
(3) 7.80 18 Burgas 10.90
20.05
(13.84)
8
(7) 4 .59 15
Silistra 36.10 34 .34(40.72)
4
(4) 5.60 26
Sofia 
District 10.50
7 .21
(0.23)
26
(27) 6 .13 11
Shumen 27.50 29 .14(39.78)
5
(5) 10.40  5 Shumen 10.40
39 .78
(29.14)
5
(5) 8.05  4
National 
Total 12 .
9 .42
(16.06) –  8 .14 –
National 
Total  8 .14
16.06
(9.42) – 4 .68 –
Source: Central Electoral Commission (2005), Bulgarian Census (2001).
Examination of the extreme values in the distribution of the ethnic minority- and 
radical-right vote in the 2005 election confirms that electoral support for the Attack Party 
does not follow demographic patterns. By contrast, the MRF vote is entirely determined 
by the geographic concentration of minorities in the Bulgarian population. The statistics 
demonstrate that the Attack vote cannot be linked to ethnically mixed regions with a 
Roma minority, despite the aggressive anti-Roma focus of Siderov’s electoral campaign. 
While these findings support the relevance of political agency to voter mobilization, 
they also suggest that voting may not be a predictable process of market clearance but 
rather a situational occurrence without foundations in the classical supply-side factors 
of voting. The differences between conventional propositions and the à la carte hypo-
thesis become apparent. The evidence on the dimensions of political agency, notably 
the mismatch between Attack’s ideological appeals and the lack of minority-related 
distribution of the radical-right vote, lends support to the à la carte proposition that 
radical-right voting is most likely neither a positive vote for the radical right per se, 
nor a negative note against the establishment but a mix of contextual determinants, 
key among which is the lack of correspondence between voter expectations and party 
supply. The following section will examine the goodness of fit between voter preferen-
ces and party supply from the perspective of electoral demand. 
Voter demand à la carte
The structure of voter demand was critical to Attack’s electoral outcome. The radical 
right benefited from a key attribute of the electoral campaign – voter receptiveness to 
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electoral mobilization strategies. While Attack’s appeal is generally cited as a factor con-
tributing to radical-right voting, it does little to explain why voters voted the way they did. 
The surprise electoral breakthrough of the Attack Party has remained a puzzle, at best too 
simplistically attributed to xenophobia, nationalism, and anti-establishment sentiments. 
Three-dimensional change in voter demand
Similar to the long-term trends informing the context of political agency, voter demand 
has been in the process of change long before the 2005 election. Three interrelated trends 
– the prevalent structure of political cleavages, value orientations, and voter evaluations 
– were instrumental in sustaining a sizeable cohort of “free floating voters” (Dalton, 2002: 
207) whose electoral preferences were unbound by social and ideological determinants. 
The most significant trajectory of socio-political change has been voter dealignment 
and the resulting reorientation of electoral preferences according to individual issue 
mobilization, anti-establishment protest, or performance voting. A number of authors 
have identified such trends as a decline of the impact of cleavage patterns in party 
politics previously “frozen” along the formative structure of societal divisions (Dalton, 
2002, Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, Mair 1997). 
Siaroff (2000) has noted that during the 1990s, class has remained the most pronoun-
ced cleavage in Bulgarian party politics, followed by regional and religious cleavages.22 
However, the surprise election victory of the NMSS in 2001 revealed that the role of class 
in voting had declined. Most importantly, the left-right distinction in political competition 
became less salient after the 1997 election. The socio-structural determinants of electoral 
behaviour for the majority of voters opened up to the influence of declining partisanship, 
vote-switching and greater receptiveness towards new parties. As Sarah Birch has noted: 
“The de facto duopoly [between BSP and UDF] served the interests of both parties while 
maintaining the outward appearance of democratic alternation of power. The vote for the 
former King’s newly formed political grouping [NMSS] may be interpreted as an act of 
desperation by an electorate that could not imagine a leadership worse than the one they 
had, and was therefore prepared to ‘try anything’. […] the electorate also demonstrated 
that it was not subservient to the two main parties” (Birch 2003: 144).
The continuing decline of the bipolar model of Bulgarian party politics after the 
2001 election provides evidence to the effect that economic and retrospective models 
of voting have become relevant to large proportions of the electorate. Vote-switching 
developed into an important electoral factor. After 42.73 per cent of the electorate chan-
ged their party of choice by voting for the NMSS in the 2001 election, 19.63 per cent 
voted for new parties in 2005. On average, 32 per cent of voters switched to another 
party in the 2005 election. The data below demonstrate that electoral choices within the 
centre have been least stable. The principal centrist party NMSS lost 23.83 per cent of 
22 Dalton (2002: 207) estimates that the association between religion and electoral choice in Bulgaria is the 
strongest in Eastern Europe (Cramer’s V correlation of .29).

its vote share nationally. As 71.2 per cent of its 2001 voters supported it in 2005, the 
consistent share of NMSS voters in the electorate stood at 14.17 per cent in 2005. 
Table 5: Sources of party vote in the 2005 election, % of voting choice in 2001
Party NMSS UDF BSP MrF Did not vote Vote share 200
BSP 14.20  3.80 70.80  0.60  8.40 30.95
NMSS 71.20  7.20  3.70  0.70 14.30 19 .88
DSB 11.90 63.10  3.10  0.40  9.90  6 .44
BPU 24.70 27.70  5.80  0.00 16.10  5 .19
attack 34.90 11.30 13.10  0.50 20.30  8 .14
MrF  5.90  3.50  3.20 69.10 11.50 12 .81
UDF 11.60 72.70  3.30  0.40  8.90  7 .68
Others 25.20 16.30 17.20  6.50 17.20  8.90
Source: MBMD Exit poll, 25 June 2005, Sega Daily, (28 June 2005), p. 3. 
 Change in the distribution of individual values and political orientations has emer-
ged as a second major development in voter demand since the 1990s. The contradictory 
evolution of tolerance in Bulgarian society represents one of the principal outcomes 
of value change. Three consecutive waves of the World Values Survey (1990, 1997, 
and 1999) indicate that during the 1990s, pluralism in Bulgarian society increased 
considerably. As the graph line below demonstrates, key aggregate measures of social 
and political tolerance experienced positive trends. 
Graph 2: Tolerance and value change
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Data Source: World Values Survey (Bulgaria) 1990, 1999. Data on race compares 1990 
and 1997 data (question not asked in 1999). 
Summary statistics show that the largest increase in tolerance was 
observed vis-à-vis people of different race (21.7 per cent), Muslims (19.5 
per cent), people with AIDS, and homosexuals. Social intolerance 
persisted only with regard to drug addicts and heavy drinkers. 
Furthermore, World Values Surveys and Eurobarometer data provide 
measures of public dispositions towards nationalism. Bulgarians are not 
more nationalistic than other Central and Eastern Europeans. 
Eurobarometer polls indicate that 70 per cent of Bulgarians are very or 
quite proud of their country versus 86 per cent of Eastern Europeans and 
83 per cent of West-Europeans on average. The proportion of Bulgarians 
sharing exclusively national versus a common national and European 
identity is in line with European averages. In 2001 39 per cent of 
respondents saw themselves as Bulgarians only and 39 per cent felt both 
Bulgarian and European. In 2005 the respective figures were 45 per cent 
(national identity only) versus 49 per cent (national and European 
identity). In the Central and Eastern European EU member states, these 
indicators were 43 per cent versus 42 per cent in 2001 and 42 per cent 
versus 55 per cent in 2005.73
Against the background of established trends of increasing pluralism and 
tolerance in Bulgarian society, more recent data reveal that such political 
indicators have been affected by negative change in interethnic attitudes 
developing within the Bulgarian ethnic majority. A nationally 
representative survey conducted in 2005 found that large proportions of 
Bulgarians prefer not to live in the same country with people from the 
73 Source: Eurobarometer 54.1 (2001) and 63 (2005). 
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Data Source: World Values Survey (Bulgaria) 1990, 1999. Data on race compares 1990 and 1997 data 
(question not sked in 1999).
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Summary statistics show that the largest increase in tolerance was observed vis-
à-vis people of different race (21.7 per cent), Muslims (19.5 per cent), people with 
AIDS, and homosexuals. Social intolerance persisted only with regard to drug addicts 
and heavy drinkers.
Furthermore, World Values Surveys and Eurobarometer data provide measures of 
public dispositions towards nationalism. Bulgarians are not more nationalistic than other 
Central and Eastern Europeans. Eurobarometer polls indicate that 70 per cent of Bulga-
rians are very or quite proud of their country versus 86 per cent of Eastern Europeans 
and 83 per cent of West-Europeans on average. The proportion of Bulgarians sharing 
exclusively national versus a common national and European identity is in line with 
European averages. In 2001 39 per cent of respondents saw themselves as Bulgarians 
only and 39 per cent felt both Bulgarian and European. In 2005 the respective figures 
were 45 per cent (national identity only) versus 49 per cent (national and European 
identity). In the Central and Eastern European EU member states, these indicators were 
43 per cent versus 42 per cent in 2001 and 42 per cent versus 55 per cent in 2005.23
Against the background of established trends of increasing pluralism and tolerance 
in Bulgarian society, more recent data reveal that such political indicators have been 
affected by negative change in interethnic attitudes developing within the Bulgarian 
ethnic majority. A nationally representative survey conducted in 2005 found that large 
proportions of Bulgarians prefer not to live in the same country with people from the 
minority groups, such as Roma (27 per cent of respondents), Turks (18 per cent), Jews 
(16 per cent), and Armenians (13 per cent) (Cohen 2005). The survey also established 
that racist attitudes are likely to influence electoral behaviour. Large segments of the 
ethnic majority regardless of age, education, residence, or income associate their voting 
preferences with ethnicity criteria.
Table 6: Partisanship and voting preferences, Bulgarian ethnic majority (2005)
Question: Would you vote for a candidate nominated by your party, if the candidate 
were a Roma?
Answer: Percentage of negative responses by demographic group
Gender Age Education Residence Income
Male 75 18-30 75 University degree 68 Capital city 80 High 75
Female 77 60-70 80 Primary 69 Village 77 Low 84
Data Source: Cohen (2005: 14).
The data are indicative of a public tendency to formulate political preferences 
along alternative dimensions of party support: deepening centre-periphery and regi-
onal cleavages and the continued decline of class as the primary referent of electoral 
competition. 
23 Source: Eurobarometer 54.1 (2001) and 63 (2005).
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Voter distancing from and disillusionment with political life and the establishment 
represents the third trajectory of long-term change in Bulgarian electoral politics, reflected 
in declining levels of political trust and measures of personal efficacy. Since the 2001 
election personal satisfaction with life and confidence in political institutions has been 
consistently lower in Bulgaria than in other East-European countries. Cross-national 
research reveals that by the time of the 2005 election, the Bulgarians had emerged as the 
most pessimistic nation in Europe. Only 29 per cent of Bulgarians were satisfied with 
personal life in 2005 versus 80 per cent on average in the European Union. By contrast, 
Bulgarians have higher confidence in the European Union and other international insti-
tutions (72 per cent approval) than European citizens on average (59 per cent).24 
a social structure of radical-right voting?
The 2005 electoral campaign was affected by the enmeshing of such contradictory 
trends in voter demand. A number of relationships between socio-structural and political 
variables, on the one hand, and the distribution of voter choices suggest that electoral 
support for the radical right emerged as an expression of volatile predispositions and 
short-term preferences, an à la carte selection whereby different categories of voters 
opted for the radical right without a coherent approval of its principal tenets: nationalist 
ideology, populist appeal, anti-system rhetoric, and charismatic leadership style. 
The foundations of voter party choices in the 2005 election varied widely. Pre-
election polls found that 32 per cent of decided voters intended to support the party of 
their usual preference regardless of whether it included candidates who they personally 
did not like; 24 per cent intended to vote for the party of their preference only if it did 
not include candidates whom they personally did not approve; 26 per cent intended to 
vote based exclusively on candidate names in the party lists without a clear support 
for any of the parties in the election; and 18 per cent had no opinion on whether party 
or candidate approval would affect their motivation to vote.25 The evidence suggests 
that the election was open to personalization of the vote, an occurrence particularly 
instrumental in Attack’s electoral campaign based on charismatic leadership. 
A second important development in the 2005 election was the use of ethno-cent-
rism and anti-minority rhetoric as tools of voter mobilization. While the electoral 
geography of the Attack Party reveals that the ethnic factor was not associated with the 
distribution of radical-right voting in the election, the fact that 99.2 per cent of Attack’s 
vote was derived from within the ethnic majority points to the relevance of ethnicity 
and interethnic attitudes to voting choices.26 
24 See Eurobarometer poll data at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm (20 December 2006)
25 See Alfa Research pre-election poll summary, 20 April 2005 at http://www.aresearch.org/doc.
php?en=08&id=21 (20 September 2005).
26 For comparison, the ethnic majority accounts for between 94.20% (UDF) and 97.40% (DSB) of the 
mainstream party vote. The vote share of ethnic Bulgarians in the predominantly Turkish MRF is 
13.60%. In the 2005 election, the MRF derived 80.0% of its national vote from ethnic Turks and 5.9% 
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Analysis of individual-level data permits to outline the socio-demographic profile 
of the Attack voters beyond their apparent identification as belonging to the Bulgarian 
ethnic majority. Post-election public opinion polls contain information on key dimen-
sions of party support in the 2005 election: ideological, social, and performance-based 
indicators which may be examined as possible correlates of radical-right voting. One 
of the tasks is to compare the socio-structural characteristics of the Attack voters rela-
tive to the mainstream-party voters, and make inference with regard to the sources of 
electoral support for the radical right in Bulgaria. 
Table 7 demonstrates that there are significant demographic differences between 
radical- right voters and mainstream-party voters. Such differences are established at two 
levels: ratios between individual sub-groups of voters in the national vote for the Attack 
Party and the mainstream parties and, depending on the significance of sub-group diff-
erences, the strength of association between individual demographic, socio-economic, 
and political variables and voting choices. Over- or, respectively, under-representation 
of individual voter categories in Attack’s national vote share relative to the mainstream 
party vote indicates the extent to which electoral support for the Attack Party depends 
on the vote of particular cohorts of the electorate according to gender, age, location of 
residence, education, class, economic evaluations and political orientations. 
Table 7: Comparative socio-demographic profile of the Attack Voter 
Variable
attack 
Voters
(% in total)
Mainstream- 
party voters
(% in total)
Over-/under-
representation 
of group
Cramer’s V 
correlation
Gender .031 (n/s)
Male 53.7 (29) 47.4 (359) 1.13
Female 46.3 (25) 52.6 (398) 0.88
age .092**
18-29 5.6 (3) 13.9 (105) 0.40
30-39 13.0 (7) 16.0 (121) 0.81
40-49 18.5 (10) 16.0 (121) 1.16
50-59 31.5 (17) 19.4 (147) 1.62
60 and over 31.5 (17) 34.7 (263) 0.91
Type of residence .117*
Village 16.4 (9) 35.8 (271) 0.46
Town 29.1 (16) 19.9 (151) 1.48
Administrative city 43.6 (24) 30.0 (234) 1.45
Capital 10.9 (55) 14.3 (108) 0.76
from the Roma minority. Source: Exit poll data of the 2005 parliamentary election, Sega Daily, 28 June 
2005, p. 3. Census data (2001) determines the ethnic composition of the Bulgarian population as 83.94% 
Bulgarians, 9.41% Turks, 4.68% Roma, and 1.97% other minority groups.
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Education .096*
College and higher 22.2 (12) 17.8 (135) 1.25
Secondary 61.1 (33) 47.4 (359) 1.29
Primary and lower 16.7 (9) 34.8 (264) 0.48
Class(i) .101 (n/s)
Blue-collar worker 26.5 (9) 20.7 (66) 1.27
White-collar worker 44.1 (15) 40.4 (129) 1.08
Manager/Director 20.6 (7) 16.6 (53) 1.24
Routine non-manual 5.9 (2) 12.9 (41) 0.48
Small business owner 2.9 (1) 6.0 (19) 0.48
Employer 0.0 (0) 3.4 (11) 0.0
Occupation 0.099 (n/s)2
Full/part-time employed 60.0 (33) 43.1 (326) 1.39
Student 1.8 (1) 2.8 (21) 0.64
Unemployed 3.6 (2) 13.6 (103) 0.26
Retired 32.7 (18) 38.3 (290) 0.85
House person 1.8 (1) 2.2 (17) 0.81
Notes: N=812 unless noted otherwise. * p< .05; ** p<.01.
(i) N=353.(ii) Numbers in columns two and three are percentages of party voters, with numbers of respondents 
in brackets. Column four reports the ratio between individual group support for the Attack Party and the 
combined mainstream party vote share of the respective group. Coefficients above 1.0 indicate that a given 
group is over-represented in the radical-right vote share relative to the national share of that group in 
the mainstream party vote (over-representation ratios in italics/bold). Coefficients below l.0 indicate that 
a sub-group in the radical-right vote share is under-represented relative to its national proportion of the 
mainstream-party vote. See Norris (2005: 140-146) and McGann and Kitschelt (2005: 461–2). 
Source: BBSS-Gallup poll, December 2005.
The descriptive statistics reveal that, relative to voters for the mainstream parties, 
Attack’s supporters are over-represented in the cohorts of male voters (1.1) residing in 
large cities and towns (1.46) but not in the capital, aged between 40 and 60 (50 per cent 
of all Attack voters), with secondary (1.29) and higher education (1.25). The statistics 
show that Attack’s vote share is derived predominantly from these categories of voters. 
Chi-square tests conducted with respect to radical-right voting versus voting for the 
mainstream parties across all demographic and socio-economic variables reveal that 
differences by location, age, and education are statistically significant and the relation-
ship between these variables and voting choice is weak-to-moderate. Such comparisons 
point to the potential relevance of socio-structural variables to explaining the Attack 
vote by the socio-demographic structure of the Bulgarian electorate. However, more 
contextualized comparisons with the socio-demographic profile of voters for individual 
parties reveal that the Attack voters are similar to NMSS (liberal centre) and right-wing 
voters (UtDF, DSB, and BPU combined) in key socio-economic variables, such as class 
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and education, status as self-employed, age, and location of residence.27 Such findings 
fail to validate claims that Attack’s voters have a distinct socio-demographic profile 
despite the significant differences with the mainstream electorate as a whole. 
Differences in political and economic evaluations?
Table 8 demonstrates that Attack voters differ significantly from voters for the 
mainstream parties according to performance evaluations; both with regard to personal 
economic situation and sociotropic assessments (the association between economic 
evaluations and voting, although statistically significant, is weak). 
Table 8: Performance evaluations of the Bulgarian voters, 2006 
Economic  
performance
attack 
Voters
Mainstream 
party voters
Over-/under-
representation  
of group
Cramer’s V 
correlation
Personal satisfaction 
with life(ii) 83.9 (73) 72.9 (717)
1.17 0.09*
Sociotropic evaluation 71.3 (62) 55.1 (549) 1.29 0.09***
Notes: * p< .05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001. On column four, see note (ii) in Table 7.
 N=1082. Personal satisfaction with life is reported as percent of respondents dissatisfied with personal 
life (answers “life is hard” and “hardly making a living”). Sociotropic evaluation is measured as percent 
of respondents dissatisfied with the situation in the country (answer “the country is moving in the wrong 
direction”). 
Data source: BBSS-Gallup, May 2006. 
Once again, such differences disappear in comparisons with individual parties. 
There is no statistically significant difference in sociotropic evaluations between 
Attack and UtDF voters, who otherwise report significantly higher rates of satisfaction 
with their personal life. UtDF voters are typical of those who would vote for centre-
right opposition parties after the 2001 election. The UtDF has established itself as 
the principal opposition party in parliament. Furthermore, while there are significant 
sociotropic differences between Attack and MRF voters, such differences are not 
valid with respect to egotropic evaluations. MRF and Attack voters have the highest 
proportions of respondents dissatisfied with their personal economic situation. As with 
socio-demographic variables, performance evaluations problematize conventional 
explanations. The Attack voters share a dissatisfaction with life with voters of predo-
minantly working-class and lower education cohorts (MRF voters), and share socio-
demographic characteristics with centre-right voters from higher-education cohorts 
living in urban areas (NMSS and UtDF). Both sets of variables are instrumental in 
establishing a rather eclectic voter profile of the radical right.
27 The difference with voters of the centre according to type of residence is significant at the .1 level 
(p=.067, Cramer’s V=.137). Summary statistics of tests conducted with respect to individual parties are 
not reported here but are available on file from the author.
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Political attitudes constitute the third set of variables indicative of the electoral 
preferences of the Attack voters. Political self-identification, measures of political 
trust, confidence in the Attack Party and its charismatic leader Volen Siderov, as well 
as indicators of the stability of electoral choice provide conclusive evidence of the à la 
carte composition of Attack’s electorate. 
Political views are the central political variable linking voters to party choice. Mea-
sured as self-placement according to the left-right scale, it constitutes a stable predictor 
of voters’ psychological attachments to political parties (Lewis-Beck 1988: 59). The 
sub-group composition of the radical-right vote according to political views in Table 9 
reveals that the radical right is significantly different from the mainstream party vote 
and is comprised predominantly of voters from the liberal centre and those who cannot 
identify their political views according to left-centre-right categorization. 
Table 9: Comparison of political views of Attack/ mainstream party voters
Political values of attack’s voters by 
group relative to the party’s average 
electoral support in all groups: .0% 
(poll data)
Political values of attack’s voters versus 
voters of all mainstream parties: attack’s 
over/under-representation by group
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Left  1 .4 0.17  5.7 (5) 36.03 (361) 0.16
Right  5 .4 0.67 10.3 (9)  15.9 (158) 0.68
Centre 15.0 1 .87  35.6 (31)  17.8 (177) 2.00
Cannot estimate 12 .3 1 .54  48.3 (42)  30.1 (299) .60
Note: N=1082. On column six, see note (ii) in Table 7
Data source: BBSS-Gallup, May 2006. 
Individual party comparisons further reveal that, counterintuitively, Attack voters 
are similar to NMSS voters, i.e. with primarily centrist political views. Second, the radi-
cal-right vote is derived predominantly from voters who cannot identify their political 
views. Such results indicate that while the distribution of political views is associated 
with party choice, the left-centre-right placement is not a stable predictor in radical-right 
voting. There is an apparent mismatch between Attack’s strongly ideological platform 
and the structure of its electoral support, predominantly within the cohorts of voters 
with undefined and liberal-centrist political views. Such a discrepancy lends support 
to the disequilibrium thesis. The chart below shows a similar lack of stable political 
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identification within the MRF and BPU electorate. By contrast, the ideological self-
placement is a strong factor for DSB and moderate-to-strong for BSP and UDF voters.
Chart 1: Political views of the party electorate
Source: Gallup-BBSS poll, May 2006.
To summarize, the disproportionately high proportion of voters with undefined 
political views for large segments of the party electorate as a whole also validates the 
disequilibrium thesis. Such voters constitute 31.6 per cent nationally, and are above the 
average for the NMSS (36.3 per cent), Attack (48.3 per cent), and MRF (67.9 per cent). 
Attack’s voters differ significantly from the electorate of the mainstream parties 
according to political trust. The average confidence in political institutions on a 1–6 
scale is 1.6 for the Ataka voters, versus 2.85 for mainstream voters. This difference is 
statistically significant also in individual comparisons with the parliamentary parties, 
except the DSB and UDF. The findings demonstrate that radical-right and right-wing 
voters are likely to associate trust in political institutions with their status as voters for the 
opposition.28 The data reveal political similarities between the right-wing and the radical 
right and fail to validate the latter’s anti-system character from a voter’s perspective.
The propensity for vote-switching is another political attribute typical of the Attack 
voters. Post-election polls reveal that Attack’s electorate is on average 1.9 times more 
likely than the electorate of the mainstream parties to vote for another party in future 
elections suggesting that Attack’s electoral success in the 2005 election was in part 
the result of affective voter reactions but not of stable orientations. In May 2006 29.5 
28 The index of political trust is calculated as the total of individual positive responses to six questions on 
confidence in the following political institutions: the Bulgarian Constitution, Presidency, Parliament, the 
Government, the Chief Prosecutor’s office, and local authorities. 
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per cent of the Attack voters declared an intention to vote for a newly established 
liberal-populist party also led by a charismatic leader (GERB)29 versus 15.5 per cent 
of the electorate of the mainstream parties. The evidence is at odds with the value 
proposition on radical-right voting, according to which we would expect Attack voters 
to be attracted by its ultra-nationalist content. 
For comparison, between-group differences show that vote-switching is more com-
mon for the centre-right electorate. While intentions to vote for another party affect 
between 2.6 per cent (MRF) and 7.0 per cent (BSP) of the centre-left voters, the values 
of this indicator increase considerably for right-of-centre voters – 23.4 per cent (DSB), 
26.5 per cent (UDF), 29.5 per cent (Attack Party), and 43.6 per cent (NMSS).30 The 
Attack vote therefore may be regarded as an extreme case of vote-switching, typical of 
the electorate as a whole.
As Table 9 demonstrates, there are significant differences also in regard to issue-
specific political evaluations of radical-right versus mainstream voters. However, 
introducing temporal comparisons yields surprising results. Key indicators of poli-
tical confidence of the Attack voters change considerably outside the context of the 
electoral campaign. Only charismatic leadership and confidence in the Attack Party 
remain highly correlated with party choice, despite falling confidence in the party and 
its leader among the electorate. 
Table 9: Evolution of political confidence, Attack versus mainstream-party voters
Variables attack Voters
Mainstream 
party voters
Over-/under-
representation 
of group
Cramer’s V 
correlation
Confidence in Volen Siderov 
October 2005
May 2006
81.5 (32)
43.7 (38)
11.4 (105)
5.8 (56)
7.15
7.53
.385*** 
.270**
Confidence in the Attack 
Party
October 2005
May 2006
69.0 (29)
51.1 (45)
7.6 (73)
6.6 (66)
9.07
7.74
.408***
.419***
Confidence in NATO
October 2005
May 2006
28.6 (12)
40.8 (20)
37.7 (361)
38.2 (206)
0.76
1.06
.113 **
.041 (n/s)
Confidence in the EU
October 2005
May 2006
38.1 (16)
58.0 (51)
51.6 (494)
54.5 (542)
0.74
1.06
.083*
.044 (n/s)
Notes: Sample size October 2005, N=1000; May 2006, N=590. * p< .05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001.
On column four, see note (ii) in Table 7.
Data source: BBSS-Gallup, December 2005; May 2006. 
29 Party name GERB (“coat of arms”) is abbreviation of Citizens for the European Development of Bulga-
ria, a populist party established in 2006 by Sofia Mayor Boiko Borissov, former NMSS leader.
30 Source: BBSS-Gallup survey data, May 2006. 
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Such individualized comparisons reveal that Attack’s voters do not consistently 
agree with the principal issue positions of the party. Over time (removed from the 
influence of Attack’s electoral campaign), the Attack voters are likely to follow the 
distribution of political confidence typical of the mainstream party electorate. While 
they have significantly lower confidence in NATO, the radical-right voters are not the 
most sceptical in that respect. May 2006 poll data indicate that left-wing BSP voters 
have the lowest level of confidence in NATO (31.1 per cent). Similarly, the Ataka 
electorate has a higher level in confidence in the EU than BSP voters (47.3 per cent) 
and MRF voters (44.3 per cent) and this difference is statistically significant.31 The 
findings once again point to a mismatch between party positions and voters, taking into 
account that anti-NATO appeals were central to Attack’s electoral campaign and fully 
in line with its nationalist ideological platform. On the contrary, all mainstream parties 
emphasized pro-Euro-Atlantic integration positions. 
In conclusion, the wide variation in political views and orientations does not 
allow the establishment of a clear-cut electoral profile of Attack’s voters which would 
distinguish them from the political mainstream. While not a completely classless 
vote – individual categories of voters are significantly over- and under-represented 
in Attack’s electorate – the radical-right vote is otherwise broadly based across social 
strata and does not conform to sociological accounts which identify its sources among 
the working-class, unemployed, self-employed, and lower-education cohorts. The 
distribution of political views also fails to validate propositions of association between 
political variables, while repeatedly pointing to the role of contextual and short-term 
factors of political agency. The various streams of social pessimism – socio-economic, 
demographic, and political – converge in an à la carte model of voter choice valid 
across social strata and political attitudes.
Conclusion
 The findings along all dimensions of the à la carte model presented here validate 
its core proposition that electoral support for the radical right is not a coherent vote 
shaped by stable predictors, such as social structure, interests and values, but a voting 
choice in the context of disequilibrium between party supply and voter expectati-
ons. Radical-right voting represents an element of diverging and/or unmet electoral 
expectations. 
Such findings, although counterintuitive, are not unusual. Studies of the radical right 
in Western Europe have found that although the extreme-right parties have a clearly 
defined nationalist-populist ideology, voters often ignore its profound implications for 
the political community and, in the context of social change and rising insecurity, vote 
for the radical right based on affective or single-issue appeals, lack of political trust, or 
charismatic leadership. Voters understand the radical right as a vehicle of mobilization 
31 Ibid.
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of diverse (positive and/or negative) affective reactions, not necessarily a rational 
choice reflecting stable individual orientations. 
As the Bulgarian case study demonstrates, public confidence in the radical right is 
not consistent over time but it is sustained by the opportunity to vote based on individual 
aspects of its electoral appeals in the absence of clear ideological self-identifications. 
The flexibility of à la carte voting is not readily applicable to the mainstream parties 
generally evaluated according to substantive issues. As a result, this model of voting 
has become the electoral privilege of the radical right and a resource for its sustained 
presence in the electoral market. 
The possibility for formulation of voting choice in terms of a menu selection 
points to two conclusions: Firstly, the à la carte model is deceptive. It grants public 
legitimacy to extremist political actors who do not provide voters with meaningful 
political alternatives. Outside the context of electoral competition, voter confidence in 
the radical right declines thus distorting the validity of its electoral outcome. Second-
ly, the efforts of building a public cordon sanitaire around the anti-system political 
behaviour of the radical right are likely to be ineffective. Regardless of its ideological 
and programmatic positions, at odds with the liberal-pluralist consensus and with the 
political expectations of its own electorate, the radical right will continue to appeal 
to voters due to unmet electoral demand in the mainstream political market, where 
political innovation has stalled or remains limited. 
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